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Abstract
This paper formulates equilibrium concepts in the large (non atomic)
household model under the team interpretation, characterizes a class
of equilibrium allocations, explores whether an equilibrium allocation
in the large-household model has a foundation in the finite-household
model, and establishes the existence of equilibrium allocations gener-
ated by generalized Nash bargaining.
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1 Introduction
Search models play a dominant role in labor economics and a prominent
role in monetary economics. In such models, meeting-specific shocks are
obvious sources of heterogeneity in wealth. Because such heterogeneity pre-
cludes closed-form solutions, eﬀorts have been made to create models in which
equilibria have degenerate distributions of wealth. One such model is the so-
called large-household model initiated by Merz [11] in labor economics and
by Shi [15] in monetary economics. In this model, each household consists
of a nonatomic measure of agents and each agent from a household meets
someone from outside the household–a firm in [11] or an agent from an-
other household in [15]. If all households start with the same wealth, then it
is feasible for all households to experience the same distribution of meeting
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outcomes, and, by a law of large numbers argument, to end up with the same
wealth. But feasibility should not be confused with equilibrium.
There are two conceivable interpretations of the household construct,
each of which leads to a distinct notion of equilibrium. A household can
be viewed as a team in the sense of Marschak and Radner [10]: each agent in
the household is a decision maker, but all share the same objective function.
Alternatively, a household can be viewed as a programmer and the agents
as automata: the programmer, the unique decision maker, chooses what the
agents do in pairwise meetings. Here, I adopt the team interpretation. It
permits us to adopt an oﬀ-the-shelf equilibrium concept that provides a uni-
fied treatment–one that applies independent of the size of the household. In
particular, the standard single-agent household is a special case. In contrast,
as is well known, the programmer-automata interpretation turns a sequential
game into a simultaneous-move game,1 and, consequently, as demonstrated
in appendix II, gives rise to a plethora of equilibria.2
Although not made explicit, the team interpretation seems to be the in-
terpretation [11, 15]. However, the authors do not correctly treat the implied
interdependence of trading outcomes among members of the same household.
Rauch [13], in a lengthy comment on [15], pointed out the problem.3 But his
suggested correction is incomplete. In particular, neither he nor the authors
whose work he criticizes present a complete and consistent definition of equi-
librium. The missing ingredient is a complete and consistent description of
the agent’s oﬀ-equilibrium payoﬀs, and, as a consequence, they do not prove
that an equilibrium exists.
Here I work with the team notion in the context of a money model. In or-
der to distinguish the role of large to ensure the feasibility of degeneracy from
the role of large to produce the linearity of payoﬀs to a household member
(linearity is implied by the infinitessimal contribution of that member to the
household’s money holdings), I set up the model in a way that the feasibility
1As a simple example, think about two players play an ultimatum game through au-
tomata. Also, see Abreu and Rubinstein [2, pg. 1256] for a discussion in the context of
the prisoner’s dilemma game.
2Following Shi [16], recent literature (e.g., Head and Shi [16], Shi and Wang [17])
seems to adopt the programmer-automata interpretation, but fails to recognize the implied
multiplicity of equilibria.
3The problem in [11], as far as I know, has not been explicitly pointed out, but it appears
to be recognized by researchers. Seemingly to avoid this problem in an application, for
instance, den Haan, Ramery andWatson assume that the utility function of each household
member depends on the household’s aggregate consumption (see [3, footnote 7]).
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of degeneracy does not depend on the size of the household. In particular,
search is directed–a buyer always meets a seller, and buyers and sellers in
each household are indexed by the same set. Then I define equilibrium (sec-
tion 3), characterize a class of equilibrium allocations (section 4), explore
whether an equilibrium allocation in the large-household setting has a foun-
dation in the finite-household setting (section 5), and prove the existence of
equilibrium allocations generated by generalized Nash bargaining (section 6).
One remarkable existence result is the equilibrium in which agents from
the same large household do not jointly deviate (Proposition 4). The essential
role of large in this equilibrium is to produce the above indicated linearity,
the exact role that quasi-linearity plays in the single-agent household model
of Lagos and Wright [9]. As it turns out, the in-equilibrium trade of this
equilibrium is the one purported by some of the literature, so after suitable
reformulation results in this part of literature may be justified. My proof
technique, however, does not cover all existing applications. Indeed, my
equilibrium definition does not permit a general approach to existence. As a
matter of fact, the feasibility of degeneracy alone does not ensure existence
of certain type of degenerate equilibrium (e.g., Proposition 6 (ii)). Therefore,
I do not intend to justify the entire literature.
2 The physical environment
Time is discrete. There is a non atomic measure of infinitely lived households.
All households are ex ante identical. Each household is identified with a
probability space (I, I, μ): there are a set of buyers and a set of sellers in
the household, both indexed by I. The set I is either finite with n elements
or uncountable infinite. If the former, then μ is uniform over I and the
household is referred to as the finite household ; if the latter, then μ is non
atomic and the household is referred to as the large household.4
There is one produced and perishable good per date. At each date, agents
from diﬀerent households are matched in pairs; matching is random but in
a way that a buyer always meets a seller.5 In each meeting, the buyer can
4The household with n buyers and n sellers can be viewed as the n-fold replica of the
household with 1 buyer and 1 seller; the large household can be viewed as the limit of the
finite household as n → ∞. This is analogous to treating the large economy as the limit
of the sequence of replica economies (see Hildenbrand [5, Ch 2]).
5Search is not directed in [13, 15] so the household must be large to make degeneracy
feasible.
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consume but cannot produce the good; the seller can produce but cannot
consume the good; and the good produced must be consumed in the end
of the meeting.6 Agents from the same household cannot communicate in
pairwise meetings.
Agents from the same household share the same objective with the period
return in form of R
i∈I u(q
i
b)μ(di)−
R
i∈I c(q
i
s)μ(di),
where qib is consumption of buyer i from the household, and q
i
s is production of
seller i from the household. Each agent as an independent decision maker (or
player) maximizes expected discounted utility with discount factor β ∈ (0, 1).
As is standard, u is bounded, u0 > 0, u00 < 0, u(0) = 0, and u0(0) =∞; it is
without loss of generality to set c(q) = q.
There is another durable and intrinsically useless object called money.
The stock of money is constant. Each household starts at date 0 with one
unit of money. There is an upper bound M > 1 on the household’s money
holdings. WhenM is finite, it is non binding in the sense given below (finite-
ness of M is only used in Propositions 3-4, and its roles are discussed there).
In each pairwise meeting, agents may exchanges the good for money; the
trading outcome is determined by a way described below. Agents from a
household are anonymous to agents from other households, so each agent’s
trading history is unknown to agents of other households (but known to
agents from the same household).
Two more assumptions about the physical environment are as follows.
First, within each household, money is evenly redistributed among its buyers
at the start of each date (note then sellers hold zero). This assumption is
explicitly made in [13, 15]; here it permits me to simplify the individual
agent’s state space (see more in footnote 9). Second, in each meeting, one
agent’s money holding and his household’s start-of-date money holding are
common knowledge to the relevant pair. This assumption is consistent with
the treatment in [13, 15]; here it permits me to avoid dealing with asymmetric
information. Without these two assumptions, I cannot establish the existence
results in section 6.7
6Inspired by Kiyotaki and Wright [6], [13, 15] consider multiple types of goods and
households. In this setting, one can further assume that buyers pool goods together after
search. It is easy to adapt formulations and results below for these variants.
7Admittedly, it is restrictive that money must be redistributed in the special way, and
it is peculiar that one agent can observe another agent’s household money holding. One
might think, however, that they are due to some unmodelled features of the environment.
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3 Allocation, trading mechanism, and equilibrium
My first goal is to examine conditions under which an allocation can be
an equilibrium allocation under some trading mechanism. An allocation
prescribes a trade for each pairwise meeting conditional on certain factors;
a trading mechanism specifies for each pairwise meeting sets of actions for
agents and amapping from actions to trading outcomes; the matching process
and the trading mechanism imply a game so one can define equilibrium; and
an allocation is an equilibrium allocation if its prescribed trades coincide with
trades implied by some equilibrium strategy profile.
I focus on stationary allocation in that it prescribes the trade of a meeting
only conditional on states of the pair in the meeting; here and below, an agent
is said in state m if his household’s beginning-of-date money holding is m.
A generic pairwise trade is denoted by (q, l): q is the transfer of the good
(from a seller to a buyer), ln−1 is the transfer of money (from a buyer to a
seller) when the household is finite, and l is the transfer of money when the
household is large. Therefore, an allocation A is a pair real-valued functions
(q(.), l(.)) on [0,M ]2, where (q(mb,ms), l(mb,ms)) is the prescribed trade
between a buyer in state mb and a seller in state ms. (It is important to
remember the following convention: q and l are scalers; q(.) and l(.) are
functions over [0,M ]2; and q(mb,ms) and l(mb,ms) are evaluations of q(.)
and l(.) at (mb,ms).)
While allocations in concern need not be those generated by surplus-
splitting rules standard in the literature (Nash bargaining, the ultimatum
game, price taking, etc.), they satisfy two properties that allocations gen-
erated by those rules satisfy. That is, if an allocation A is an equilibrium
allocation under some trading mechanism, then its prescribed pairwise trade,
in equilibrium or oﬀ equilibrium, satisfies the sequential individual rational-
ity (SIR)–the trade weakly dominates autarky for each agent, and pairwise
eﬃciency (PE)–the trade is in the pairwise Pareto frontier.
Given A = (q(.), l(.)), I specify the following trading mechanism, denoted
TA, which can be viewed as a generalized version of the direct mechanism
in Kocherlakota [7] and Kocherlakota and Wallace [8].8 As a buyer in state
mb meets a seller in state ms, TA indicates two stages of actions. In stage 1,
the buyer and seller simultaneously announce a number from {0, 1}. If both
8These authors show that any incentive-feasible (or equilibrium) allocation under any
arbitrary trading mechanism is an incentive-feasible allocation under the direct mechanism
associated with the allocation. The direct mechanism only assures SIR.
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announce 1, then they move to stage 2; otherwise, the trade is (0, 0) and the
meeting is over. In stage 2, the buyer first proposes some (q, l) and then the
seller announces a number from {0, 1}. If 1 is announced, then (q, l) is carried
out and the meeting is over; if 0 is announced, then (q(mb,ms), l(mb,ms))–
the trade prescribed by A–is carried out and the meeting is over. As it shall
be clear later, if A is an equilibrium allocation under TA then it satisfies
SIR (ensured by stage 1) and PE (ensured by stage 2); moreover, if A is an
equilibrium allocation under other trading mechanism and satisfies SIR and
PE, then it is an equilibrium allocation under TA.
In the game implied by TA, I consider strategies by which each individual
agent does not condition his actions on his private information and calendar
time. Denote by fb a generic strategy of a buyer, and by fs a generic strategy
of a seller. To simplify notation, I express fb and fs over the relevant domains,
so that fb = (fb1, fb2) and fs = (fs1, fs2) are represented by
fb1 : [0,M ]2 → {0, 1}, fb2 : [0,M ]2 → R2+, (1)
fs1 : [0,M ]2 → {0, 1}, fs2 : [0,M ]2 ×R2+ → {0, 1}. (2)
In words, as a buyer in state mb meets a seller in state ms, fb1(mb,ms) and
fs1(mb,ms) are numbers announced in stage 1 by the buyer and seller, respec-
tively; fb2(mb,ms) is the oﬀer the buyer makes in stage 2; and fs2(mb,ms, q, l)
is the number announced by the seller in stage 2 when seeing the oﬀer (q, l).9
I restrict attention to symmetric equilibrium in that all buyers (from all
households) choose the same fb and all sellers choose the same fs.
Definition 1 Given the trading mechanism TA, an equilibrium is a strategy
profile represented by f = (fb, fs) (see (1)-(2)) such that it is optimal for one
agent to follow actions indicated by f currently and in the future, provided
that all other agents, including those from the same household, follow actions
indicated by f .
By the initial distribution of money, symmetry implies that any Definition-
1 equilibrium is degenerate in that all in-equilibrium households hold one unit
of money at the start of each date. From now on, I refer to a household with
9In the absence of the special money-redistribution assumption, the individual agent’s
state is a probability distribution regarding how money is distributed among the household
members, and so domains of A and f pertain to a set of such distributions (instead of the
interval [0,M ]).
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one unit of money as a regular household, an agent from a regular household
as a regular agent, and a meeting between two regular agents as a regular
meeting.
I also consider a stronger notion of equilibrium, referred to as strong equi-
librium, which rules out possibility of beneficial joint deviation by members
from the same household.10 The rationale for this notion is that if members
from the same household can agree on a beneficial joint deviation, there is no
problem of implementation. Because the household members do no commu-
nicate in search, it is sensible to restrict joint deviations to those in meeting
regular agents.
Definition 2 A Definition-1 equilibrium f is strong if agents from the same
household cannot improve from any joint deviation when meeting regular
agents.
Given A = (q(.), l(.)), by a trivial application of Blackwell’s suﬃcient
conditions, there is a unique bounded function on [0,M ] satisfying
v(m) = u(q(m, 1))− q(1,m) + βv(g(m)) with g(m) = m− l(m, 1) + l(1,m).
(3)
If A is an equilibrium allocation then v is the value function on the house-
hold’s money holdings; in that equilibrium, if the household starts bym, then
with probability one, each of its buyers consumes q(m, 1), each of its sellers
produces q(1,m), and the household ends up with g(m). In what follows, I
restrict attention to A = (q(.), l(.)) satisfying (C1) q(1, 1) > 0; and (C2) the
function v given by (3) is non decreasing, continuous and concave.
If A is an equilibrium allocation, then by (C1) that equilibrium is mon-
etary. Non decreasing of v is equivalent to free disposal of money. In the
large-household setting, I identify the payoﬀ to an individual agent from
his own action in any pairwise meeting as the marginal contribution to the
agent’s objective function,11 and given concavity and continuity of v, I can
express the marginal contribution in terms of sided derivatives of v (c.f. [14,
10Note, as is standard, the notion of equilibrium only rules out possibility of beneficial
unilateral deviation. Simply put, the individual agent’s optimality in equilibrium need
not ensure the household’s optimality as a team in strong equilibrium. One can see the
analogy from a person-by-person satisfactory team decision function and the best team
decision function in [10].
11This resembles the way that Aumann and Shapley [2] define Shapley value of a non
atomic agent; note the measure of the agent is an infinitesimal so is the payoﬀ in concern.
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p 213, Theorem 23.1]). Those properties of A, as is not unusual in dynamic
models, cannot be ensured in equilibrium by primitives. I study in section 4
conditions for A with such properties to be an equilibrium allocation; I show
in section 6 the existence of equilibrium allocations with such properties.
4 Characterization of equilibrium allocation
Now fix A = (q(.), l(.)) satisfying (C1)-(C2) and suppose that it is an equi-
librium allocation under the trading mechanism TA. In order to describe no
deviation from trades prescribed by A, I first describe how an agent in arbi-
trary state m evaluates a trade in a meeting, taking as given that all other
agents from the same household obtain trades prescribed by A currently and
that v in (3) is the value function defined on the household’s money holdings.
When the household is finite and the agent in state m is a buyer, with
probability one, each of n sellers from his household trades (q(1,m), l(1,m)),
and each of other n− 1 buyers from his household trades (q(m, 1), l(m, 1)).
Therefore, if the agent trades (0, 0), then the evaluation of his objective
function is u(q(m, 1))(1−n−1)−q(1,m)+βv(g(m)+l(m, 1)n−1) (the first term
is the contribution to the objective function from other buyers’ consumption,
the second term is from all seller’s production, and the last term is from the
household’s end-of-meeting money holding). It follows that the additional
contribution from trading (q, l) to his objective function is
B0(q, l,m) = u(q)n−1+β[v(g(m)+l(m, 1)n−1−ln−1)−v(g(m)+l(m, 1)n−1)],
(4)
and this contribution in term of per unit of his measure in the set I (which
is n−1) is
B(q, l,m) = u(q) + nβ[v(g(m) + l(m, 1)n−1 − ln−1)− v(g(m) + l(m, 1)n−1)].
(5)
The analogy applies to the agent in state m is a seller. The household’s
end-of-meeting money holding is g(m)− l(1,m)n−1 if the seller trades (0, 0),
so the additional contribution from (q, l) to his objective function is
S0(q, l,m) = −qn−1+β[v(g(m)− l(1,m)n−1+ ln−1)−v(g(m)− l(1,m)n−1)],
(6)
and this contribution in term of per unit of his measure in I is
S(q, l,m) = −q+nβ[v(g(m)−l(1,m)n−1+ln−1)−v(g(m)−l(1,m)n−1)]. (7)
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When the household is large, as indicated above, I define the payoﬀ from
trading (q, l) as the marginal contribution to the agent’s objective function.
As n→∞, the limit of B(q, l,m) in (5) (S(q, l,m) in (7), resp.) defines this
contribution when the agent in state m is a buyer (seller, resp.). The limit
of B(q, l,m) in (5), still denoted B(q, l,m), is
B(q, l,m) = u(q)− βwb(l,m) with (8)
wb(l,m) = min{l, l(m, 1)}v0+(g(m)) + max{0, l − l(m, 1)}v0−(g(m)),
and the limit of S(q, l,m) in (7), still denoted S(q, l,m), is
S(q, l,m) = −q + βws(l,m) with (9)
ws(l,m) = min{l, l(1,m)}v0−(g(m)) + max{l − l(1,m), 0}v0+(g(m)),
where v0−(z) is the left derivative and v0+(z) is the right derivative of v at z.12
I have assumed that when M is finite it is non binding. Precisely, this
means that for any feasible transfer of money from a buyer in an arbitrary
state mb to a seller in an arbitrary state ms, given all other agents follow
trades prescribed by A, the buyer’s and seller’s households end the date with
holdings less than M . That is, when the household is finite, for all (mb,ms),
g(ms)− l(1,ms)n−1 +mbn−1 < M and g(mb)− l(mb, 1)n−1+mbn−1 < M ;13
when the household is large, for all m, g(m) < M . With this assumption, I
can apply the payoﬀs in (4)-(9) below with no restriction.
For A to be an equilibrium allocation under TA, as a buyer in state
mb meets a seller in state ms, no one announces 0 at stage 1, so
B(q(mb,ms), l(mb,ms),mb) ≥ 0, (10)
S(q(mb,ms), l(mb,ms),ms) ≥ 0; (11)
the buyer cannot find an oﬀer at stage 2 leading to pairwise improvement, so
(q(mb,ms), l(mb,ms)) ∈ argmax
(q,l)
B(q, l,mb) (12)
s.t. 0 ≤ l ≤ mb and S(q, l,ms) ≥ S(q(mb,ms), l(mb,ms),ms).
12Note if v0−(g(m)) = v0+(g(m)) then wb(l,m) = ws(l,m) = lv0(g(m)). To see (8),
write v(g(m)+ l(m, 1)n−1− ln−1)− v(g(m)+ l(m, 1)n−1) as v(g(m)+ l(m, 1)n−1− ln−1)
−v(g(m)) + v(g(m))− v(g(m) + l(m, 1)n−1). The similar treatment leads to (9).
13If the buyer transfers all his holding mbn−1 to the seller, the seller’s household ends
up with g(ms)− l(1,ms)n−1 +mbn−1. If the buyer transfers zero, the buyer’s household
ends up with g(mb)− l(mb, 1)n−1 +mbn−1.
9
Now let the strategy profile fA = (fAb , f
A
s ) be given by
fAb1(mb,ms) = f
A
s1(mb,ms) = 1, (13)
fAb2(mb,ms) = (q(mb,ms), l(mb,ms)), (14)
fAs2(mb,ms, q, l) = 1 (15)
⇔ [0 ≤ l ≤ mb and S(q, l,ms) ≥ S(q(mb,ms), l(mb,ms),ms)].
If A satisfies (10)-(12) (i.e., (10)-(12) hold for all (mb,ms)), then by the
one-stage-deviation principle, fA is a Definition-1 equilibrium (so A is an
equilibrium allocation).
Now suppose that fA is a Definition-1 equilibrium. Then for a buyer in
state m in meeting a regular seller, the set of admissible trades is
Γb(m) = {(0, 0)} ∪ {(q, l) : 0 ≤ l ≤ m,S(q, l, 1) ≥ S(q(m, 1), l(m, 1), 1)};
this buyer either obtains (0, 0) at stage 1, or any (q, l) at stage 2 that gives
the seller at least the same payoﬀ as (q(m, 1), l(m, 1)). Also, for a seller in
state m in meeting a regular buyer, the set of admissible trades is
Γs(m) = {(0, 0)} ∪ {(q(1,m), l(1,m))};
this seller either obtains (0, 0) at stage 1, or (q(1,m), l(1,m)) at stage 2. It
follows that [Γb(m)× Γs(m)]I is the set of admissible joint trades for agents
from the household with m in meeting regular agents; here and below, I
denote by [K]I the product set
Q
i∈I Ki with Ki = K for all i. Then there is
no beneficial joint deviation in equilibrium fA if and only if for all m,
v(m) = maxW (γ(m)) s.t. γ(m) ∈ [Γb(m)× Γs(m)]I , (16)
where γ(m) = {(qib, lib), (qis, lis)}i∈I is μ-measurable and where
W (γ(m)) =
R
i∈I
u(qib)μ(di)−
R
i∈I
qisμ(di)+βv(m−
R
i∈I
libμ(di)+
R
i∈I
lisμ(di)). (17)
To summarize, we have
Proposition 1 Suppose that A satisfies (C1)-(C2). When the household is
finite, let B and S be as given in (5) and (7); when the household is large,
let B and S be as given (8) and (9).
(i) fA (see (13)-(15)) is a Definition-1 equilibrium if and only if A sat-
isfies (10)-(12).
(ii) fA is a Definition-2 strong equilibrium if and only if A satisfies (10)-
(12) and (16).
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Now consider T 0, an arbitrary trading mechanism (e.g., the one that dif-
fers from TA by switching roles of buyers and sellers at stage 2), and again
restrict attention to strategies by which each individual agent does not con-
dition his actions on his private information and calendar time. We can
define (symmetric) equilibrium as above. Suppose that A is an equilibrium
allocation under T 0 and satisfies SIR and PE. Then it is straightforward to
verify that it satisfies (10)-(12). We can also define strong equilibrium as
above. But in the absence of details of T 0, we can say little more about A
from knowing that the equilibrium supporting A is strong (e.g., we do not
know if (16) holds), because we only know that for agents from the household
with m, the set of admissible joint trades in meeting regular agents includes
[Γb(m)× Γs(m)]I , and is included in [Γb(m)× Γs(m)]I , where
Γb(m) = {(0, 0)} ∪ {(q(m, 1), l(m, 1)}
Γs(m) = {(0, 0)} ∪ {(q, l) : 0 ≤ l ≤ 1, B(q, l, 1) ≥ B(q(1,m), l(1,m), 1)}.
However, a sharp characterization can be made whenA satisfies hypotheses in
the next proposition: In the equilibrium supporting A, there is no beneficial
joint deviation even if for agents from the household with any m, [Γb(m)×
Γs(m)]I is the set of admissible joint trades in meeting regular agents; that
is, for all m,
v(m) = maxW (γ(m)) s.t. γ(m) ∈ [Γb(m)× Γs(m)]I , (18)
where γ(m) = {(qib, lib), (qis, lis)}i∈I is μ-measurable and W (γ(m)) is defined
by (17).
Proposition 2 Suppose that A satisfies (C1)-(C2) and v is strictly increas-
ing and diﬀerentiable. Let the household be large. If A satisfies (10)-(12),
then A satisfies (18).
All proofs are in Appendix I. To illustrate uses of properties of A and the
large household in Proposition 2, I sketch the proof here. By strict mono-
tonicity of v and (12), I show (i) if (q, l) ∈ Γb(m)\Γb(m) then B(q, l,m) <
B(q(m, 1), l(m, 1),m); and (ii) if (q, l) ∈ Γs(m)\Γs(m) then S(q, l,m) <
S(q(1,m), l(1,m),m) (here I also use concavity of u and v). With (10), (11),
(i) and (ii), by concavity of v and that the household is large, I show that
there is an optimal γ(m) with g(m) as the implied household’s end-of-meeting
holding. With this result, by applying v0−(g(m)) = v0+(g(m)) to diﬀerent com-
binations of (10), (11), (i) and (ii), I rule out all possible compositions of the
γ(m) that may lead to W (γ(m)) 6= v(m).
11
5 An approximation result
In this section, I take an -equilibrium approach to exploring whether an
equilibrium allocation A = (q(.), l(.)) in the large-household setting has a
foundation in the finite-household setting.14 Given the trading mechanism
TA, I consider two notions of  equilibrium when the household is finite.
Definition 3 An  equilibrium is a strategy profile represented by f (see (1)-
(2)) such that for one agent, the (expected lifetime) payoﬀ from any sequence
of his own actions in meeting regular agents does not exceed by  the payoﬀ
from the sequence of actions indicated by f , provided that all other agents,
including those from the same household, follow actions indicated by f .15
Definition 4 A strengthened  equilibrium is a strategy profile represented
by f such that for agents from the same household, the (expected lifetime)
payoﬀ from any sequence of their joint actions in meeting regular agents does
not exceed by  the payoﬀ from the sequence of joint actions indicated by f ,
provided that agents outside the household follow actions indicated by f .
In the rest of this section, I adopt the following notation: (a) B in (5)
and S in (7) are denoted by Bn and Sn, respectively; (b) fA in (13)-(15) with
S = Sn is denoted by fAn ; (c) for a ∈ {b, s}, Γa and Γa with B = Bn and
S = Sn are denoted by Γ
n
a and Γ
n
a , respectively; (d) W in (17) with finite I
is denoted by Wn; and (e) B in (8), S in (9), and all terms in (b)-(d) related
to the large household are maintained as they are.
The next proposition gives the main result of this section.
Proposition 3 Suppose that A satisfies (C1)-(C2) and that M is finite.
(i) If fA is a Definition-1 equilibrium when the household is large, then
for any  > 0, there exists N such that fAn is a Definition-3 n−1 equilibrium
when the household is finite with n > N .
(ii) If fA is a Definition-2 strong equilibrium when the household is large
and v0+(1) > 0, then for any  > 0, there exists N such that fAn is a Definition-
4 strengthened  equilibrium when the household is finite with n > N .
14As an alternative, one may address this issue by studying whether there exists a
sequence of equilibrium allocations in the finite-household setting which converge (in some
sense) to A as n→∞. I do not have any general result in this line.
15One may set  as an upper bound on gainings from the individual deviations each of
which starts in an arbitrary meeting, that is, the meeting partner need not be a regular
agent. Such defined  equilibrium does not aﬀect anything substantial.
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In Proposition 3 (i), I am interested in n−1 equilibrium instead of 
equilibrium because when n increases, the measure of an agent in the house-
hold decreases so in any pairwise meeting the payoﬀ from any action of the
agent decreases (see (4) and (6)). The proof of Proposition 3 is built on the
following lemma, which is closely related to Proposition 1.
Lemma 1 Suppose that A satisfies (C1)-(C2). Let the household be finite.
(i) If for all m, all (qb, lb) ∈ Γ
n
b (m) and all (qs, ls) ∈ Γns (m),
Bn(qb, lb,m)−Bn(q(m, 1), l(m, 1),m) < (1− β), (19)
Sn(qs, ls,m)− Sn(q(m, 1), l(m, 1),m) < (1− β), (20)
then fAn is a Definition-3 n−1 equilibrium.
(ii) If for all m and all γ(m) ∈ [Γnb (m)× Γns (m)]I,
Wn(γ(m))− v(m) < (1− β), (21)
then fAn is a Definition-4 strengthened  equilibrium.
The key to showing part (i) of Proposition 3 is the upper bound in (19),
and the key to part (ii) is the upper bound in (21). The basic idea behind the
first bound is as follows. For any fixed m, when n is suﬃciently large, any
trade in Γnb (m) is not far away from some trades in Γb(m), and, therefore, if
the first bound is violated by (qb, lb), then from this (qb, lb) some (q, l) in Γb(m)
with B(q, l,m) > B(q(m, 1), l(m, 1),m) can be constructed. Finiteness of M
ensures uniformity. The similar idea works for the second bound; here to
construct a suitable (q, l) in Γb(m), I need v0+(1) > 0 in one scenario.
Now suppose that when the household is finite, the set of admissible trades
for a buyer (a seller, resp.) in any state m is Γnb (m) (Γ
n
s (m), resp.). First,
maintain hypotheses in Proposition 3 (i). Then it can be shown that when n
is large, (19)-(20) hold for all m, all (qb, lb) ∈ Γ
n
b (m) and all (qs, ls) ∈ Γ
n
s (m),
and, consequently, that for any agent, the (expected lifetime) payoﬀ from
any sequence of admissible trades does not exceed by n−1 the payoﬀ from
the sequence of trades prescribed by A. Second, strengthen hypotheses in
Proposition 3 (ii) such that A satisfies (18) when the household is large. Then
it can be shown that when n is large, (21) holds for all m and all γ(m) ∈
[Γnb (m)×Γns (m)]I , and, consequently, that for agents from any household, the
(expected lifetime) payoﬀ from any sequence of admissible joint trades does
not exceed by  the payoﬀ from the sequence of joint trades prescribed by A.
From those results and the related discussion in section 4, it shall become
clear how to adapt Proposition 3 for an arbitrary trading mechanism.
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6 Generalized Nash bargaining
For the existence of equilibrium allocations studied above, following the ex-
isting literature, I focus on those generated by generalized Nash bargaining.
We say that A = (q(.), l(.)) satisfying (C1)-(C2) is generated by generalized
Nash bargaining if there exists some λ ∈ (0, 1] such that for all (mb,ms),
(q(mb,ms), l(mb,ms)) ∈ argmax
(q,l)
[B(q, l,mb)]λ[S(q, l,ms)]1−λ s.t. 0 ≤ l ≤ mb;
(22)
that is, if the buyer in state mb and the seller in state ms take the meeting-
specific Pareto frontier as the one implied by B(q, l,mb) and S(q, l,ms), then
(q(mb,ms), l(mb,ms)) is the Nash bargaining solution with λ as the buyer’s
bargaining weight. If A satisfies (C1)-(C2) and (22), then by Proposition 1,
fA is a Definition-1 equilibrium.16
First, I consider the large household. If the transfer of money is l,
wb(l,mb) = lωb and ws(l,ms) = lωs (see (8)-(9)), then the Nash solution
implies that
y(l, ωb, ωs) = argmax
q≥0
[u(q)− ωbl]λ[−q + ωsl]1−λ (23)
is the transfer of good, which satisfies
λu0(y(l, ωb, ωs))[−y(l, ωb, ωs) + ωsl] = (1− λ)[u(y(l, ωb, ωs))− ωbl]. (24)
I use this function y(.) to construct two allocations satisfying (C1)-(C2) and
(22). For the construction to go through, I need the following assumption,
(U) Either λ = 1, or λ < 1 and u00u00 ≥ u0u000.
For the first allocation, let yλ satisfy βu0(yλ) ≥ 1 and
1 =
β[λu0(yλ) + (1− λ)]
1− (1− λ)u00(yλ)[u(yλ)− ω]/[u0(yλ)u0(yλ)]
, (25)
where
ω =
λu0(yλ)yλ + (1− λ)u(yλ)
λu0(yλ) + (1− λ)
. (26)
16In case λ = 1, one can verify that this A is also an equilibrium allocation when agents
play the ultimatum game in pairwise meetings (buyers make oﬀers). In case λ < 1, if one
applies a suitable version of the Rubinstein-Stähl alternating-oﬀer game in the meeting
where the Pareto frontier is determined by B(q, l,mb) and S(q, l,ms), then after taking
the limit one obtains (q(mb,ms), l(mb,ms)) as the trade outcome.
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Existence and uniqueness of yλ follow from (U).17 Let A be defined by
q(mb,ms) = y(mb, ω, ω) and l(mb,ms) = mb. (27)
The function v implied by the allocation in (27) is
v(m) = u(y(m,ω, ω))− yλ + β(1− β)−1[u(yλ)− yλ]. (28)
Proposition 4 Suppose that M > 1 satisfies u0(y(M,ω, ω)) ≥ 1 and that
(U) holds. Let the household be large. Then A given by (27) satisfies (C1)-
(C2) and (22), and fA is a Definition-2 strong equilibrium.
Letting (ωb, ωs, l) = (ω, ω, 1) in (24) and comparing to (26), we see
y(1, ω, ω) = yλ so yλ is the regular-meeting output of the Proposition-4 allo-
cation.18 By (25), βu0(yλ) ≥ 1, and as is shown in the proof, l 7→ y(l, ω, ω) is
strictly increasing and diﬀerentiable, so the hypothesis aboutM is not vacu-
ous. Note that there is no beneficial joint deviation even if for agents from the
household with any m, the set of admissible joint trades is [Γb(m)×Γs(m)]I ,
because v is strictly increasing and diﬀerentiable (Proposition 2).
The remarkable feature of the Proposition-4 allocation is l(m, 1) = m
and l(1,m) = 1 so g(m) = 1 all m; that is, the household’s end-of-meeting
money holding does not depend on its start-of-date money holding. As a
consequence, v(.) in (28) is completely determined by its derivative at 1, v0(1).
Indeed, as shown in the proof, ω = βv0(1), and note yλ and ω are determined
by (25)-(26) without referring to any other evaluations of functions v(.) or
v0(.). The restriction on M ensures that l(m, 1) = m holds for all m.
The Proposition-4 equilibrium resembles the equilibrium in the Lagos-
Wright model [9]. In [9], agents trade in a centralized market after random
matching, and preferences over centralized-trade goods are quasi-linear. For
an internal solution in the centralized market, the agent must enter the cen-
tralized market with money holdings that are not too large. In that case, the
assumed quasi-linear preferences imply that the value function for the agent’s
17Substituting ω in (26) into (25), we obtain [λu0 + (1 − λ)][βλu0 − βλ + β − 1] =
−λ(1−λ)(u00/u0)(u− y). Then use λ− βλ+β− 1 ≤ 0 and that −u00/u0 is non decreasing
(implied by (U)).
18In dealing with symmetric Nash bargaining, Rauch [13] provides a regular-meeting
output comparable to y0.5; see section 6 for how Rauch obtains his result. Also, in a seem-
ingly programmer-automata setup, Shi [16] provides a regular-meeting output comparable
to y1; see Appendix II for how Shi obtains his result.
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end-of-match money holdings is aﬃne, and that, in turn, implies that in a
pairwise meeting, the buyer’s and seller’s payoﬀ functions are quasi linear,
linear in end-of-match money holdings. Moreover, those functions have the
same linear coeﬃcient, provided that the sum of the buyer and seller money
holdings is consistent with an internal solution in the centralized market.
In the Proposition-4 equilibrium, the buyer’s and seller’s payoﬀs are linear
in each agent’s end-of-match money holdings (so the individual agent’s pay-
oﬀ functions are quasi linear). The upper bound on the household money
holding ensures that all households have the same end-of-meeting money
holding, which in turn ensures that the linear coeﬃcients regarding money
for the buyer and seller in a meeting are identical. Finally, (U) has the same
uses in [9] as here.
Now I turn to the second allocation. Let y˜λ satisfy βu0(y˜λ) ≥ 1 and
1 =
βλu0(y˜λ)
1− (1− λ)u00(y˜λ)u(y˜λ)/[u0(y˜λ)u0(y˜λ)]
, (29)
where
ω˜ =
λu0(y˜λ)y˜λ + (1− λ)u(y˜λ)
λu0(y˜λ)
. (30)
Existence and uniqueness of y˜λ again follow from (U). Let A be defined by
q(mb,ms) = y(min{mb, 1}, 0, ω˜) and l(mb,ms) = mb. (31)
The function v implied by the allocation in (31) is
v(m) = u(y(min{m, 1}, 0, ω˜))− y˜λ + β(1− β)−1[u(y˜λ)− y˜λ]. (32)
Proposition 5 Suppose that (U) holds. Let the household be large. Then
A given by (31) satisfies (C1)-(C2) and (22), and fA is a Definition-1 (but
not Definition-2 strong) equilibrium.
Letting (ωb, ωs, l) = (0, ω˜, 1) in (24) and comparing to (30), we see
y(1, 0, ω˜) = y˜λ so y˜λ is the regular-meeting output of the Proposition-5 allo-
cation. This allocation is similar to the one in Proposition 4 except that here
v is constant over [1,M ] (so v0+(1) = 0). Now again g(m) = 1, and v(.) in
(32) is completely determined by v0−(1)–as shown in the proof, ω˜ = βv0−(1),
and note y˜λ and ω˜ are completely determined by (29)-(30).
The reason that the function v is flat is simple. Let m ≥ 1. Given all
buyers from the same household to spend m, the suitable value of v0−(1)
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induces a seller in state m to acquire 1. Given all sellers from the same
household to acquire 1, v0+(1) = 0 induces a buyer in state m to spend m,
even in case m > 1, spending m gets the same amount of good as spending
1 (note then M need not be restricted as in Proposition 4). In equilibrium
fA, if all buyers from the household with m > 1 oﬀer (y˜λ, 1) to regular sellers
and all sellers from the household accept (y˜λ, 1) from regular buyers, then
the household obtains a higher payoﬀ than following fA.19
Next I turn to two results for the finite household. Both results can be
extended to general λ; I restrict to λ = 1 for the sake of simplicity.
Proposition 6 Suppose that λ = 1. Let the household be finite.
(i) If n > 1 and M > nn−1 , then there exists A with l(1, 1) = 1 satisfying
(C1)-(C2) and (22) and with v constant over [1,M ], and fA is a Definition-1
(but not Definition-2 strong) equilibrium.
(ii) If A with l(1, 1) = 1 satisfies (C1)-(C2) and (22), then n > 1.
In Proposition 6 (i), M > nn−1 ensures non bindingness when M is fi-
nite. The allocation here resembles the one in Proposition 5. In contrast
to Proposition 5, here no single evaluation of v(.) or v0(.) (e.g., v0−(1)) can
determine the whole v(.) (because the household is finite), so the proof is not
constructive; instead, the proof uses a fixed-point argument.
I have attempted to adapt this argument to establish some A for large n
that resembles the Proposition-4 allocation with fA being a strong equilib-
rium, but I fail to obtain a positive increment of v over a neighborhood of 1.
This diﬃculty, of course, has nothing to do with the feasibility of degeneracy.
The key behind Proposition 6 (ii) is as follows. When n = 1, l(1, 1) = 1
gives rise to the dependence of the current payoﬀ to agents in state m on the
value function v in the form of v(m) = u(βv(m)) for m in a neighborhood
of 0–that is, v is a (strict) concave transformation of itself over that neigh-
borhood. This result suggests that the feasibility of degeneracy mean little
to existence of certain type of degenerate equilibrium.20
19One may regard any non strong equilibrium uninteresting in the current context.
For such a view, Proposition 5 provides an example about importance of the notion of
strong equilibrium. On the other hand, because joint deviation implicitly requires that
the household members communicate before search, existence of a non strong equilibrium
may be an interesting implication of the team model when communication among the
team members is diﬃcult (diﬃcult communication is emphasized by [10]).
20Wallace and Zhu [18, section 2] deliver the same message by a similar result obtained
from a standard single-agent household model.
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7 Comparison to the literature
As indicated above, aside from details, Shi [15] and Rauch [13] make all
important assumptions I make about the physical environment.21 They
both consider symmetric Nash bargaining. Shi [15], who initiated the use of
the large household model for money applications, describes the household’s
problem in terms of sequences of the household’s choices. In his formulation,
each household takes as given that the regular-meeting trade is the trade
that its buyers and sellers will make–independent of the household’s start-
of-date money holding. However, such trade is not feasible for a household
with m < 1, which leaves v(m) for m < 1 undefined. It also implies that
v(m) = v(1) for m ≥ 1. As Rauch [13] points out in a comment on [15],
neither is satisfactory. He proposes an alternative formulation.
Following [15], Rauch describes the household problem in sequence form.
He proposes a special Lagrangian
L({mt}, {ωt}) =
P
t
βt{F (mt, ωt) + ωt[mt+1 −mt −∆(mt, ωt)]}, (33)
where mt is the household’s money holding at the start of t, F (mt, ωt) is the
return to the household from consumption and production at t, ∆(mt, ωt) is
the net money inflow to the household at t, and ωt is the Lagrangian multi-
plier associated with the constraintmt+1 = mt+∆(mt, ωt).22 Notably, Rauch
treats ωt as a function of mt (see [13, Eqs (22)-(23)]). This function cannot
be arbitrary. It ought to be determined by some equilibrium conditions. But
Rauch provides no such conditions, so his formulation is incomplete.23
One may complete Rauch’s formulation by distinguishing the Lagrangian
multipliers in the above L from a function describing the individual agent’s
21In [13, 15], the buyer’s ratio may be endogenous and there may be a constant rate of
lump sum money transfer. I can extend the above formulations to these variants, but I
can only extend the above existence proof to deal with the variant with money transfer.
22This Lagrangian is recovered from [13, Eqs (10)-(15) and (17)] in case the buyer’s
ratio is exogenous. Although {mt} is not included as a choice in [13, Eq (10)], it should
be; otherwise, when the buyer’s ratio is exogenous, the problem is absent of choices, which
is not the case according to the context. By [13, Eq (1)], ωt is taken by the individual
agent as his marginal value of money in the Nash bargaining problem in date t meeting;
it aﬀects F and ∆ by the way given in [13, Eqs (6)-(7)].
23It is not a way to obtain completeness by assuming that ωt is a free variable as in the
usual Lagrangian formulation, because here the period return F (also the money flow ∆)
depends on ωt. For comparison, think about the Lagrangian in the planner’s version of
the growth model where the period return does not depend on multipliers.
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marginal value of money. For instance, let ωˆ(.) be such a function so that if
an agent’s household starts by m at t+1, ωˆ(m) is the agent’s marginal value
of money at date-t meeting. Then for each m0, let
Lˆ({mt}, {ωt}) =
P
t
βt{F (mt, ωˆ(mt+1)) + ωt[mt+1 −mt −∆(mt, ωˆ(mt+1)]}
(34)
so the maximum of the expected discounted utility for a household with m0
is v(m0) = max Lˆ({Mt}, {ωt}). The equilibrium conditions are for all m, (a)
ωˆ(m) = βv0(m) and (b) {m+ : m+ = m + ∆(m, ωˆ(m+)} is nonempty. Of
course, now the existence of an equilibrium means the existence of a function
ωˆ(.) satisfying (a)-(b).24 ,25
8 The concluding remarks
The equilibrium concepts developed in the above money model can be applied
to the labor search model of Merz [11]. They can also be adapted to deal
with the large firm’s decision problem in the labor search literature. The large
firm has many job positions, and the wage in each position is determined by
bargaining with a worker. But in the literature (see Pissarides [12, Ch 3.1]),
the firm takes the prevailing wage as given. This seems problematic. Instead,
following the approach used above, it could be assumed that the wage in each
position is determined by bargaining between a firm’s agent and a worker,
while taking as given the bargaining outcome between other agents of the
firm and workers.
24From such a ωˆ(.), one can construct the above defined equilibrium allocation as fol-
lows. Fix m and set m0 = m in (34) and then set an optimal m1 as g(m). Then let
(q(mb,ms), l(mb,ms)) ∈ argmax[u(q)− ωˆ(g(mb))l][−q+ ωˆ(g(ms))l] subject to 0 ≤ l ≤ ms
(note Rauch deals with symmetric Nash bargaining).
25In his analysis, Rauch ignores the eﬀect from the change in mt on ωt in [13, Eqs (22)-
(23)] but keeps it in [13, Eq (18)]. Remarkably, this inconsistency turns the Lagrangian
in concern from L in (33) into Lˆ in (34). As a result, he actually solves an equilibrium
ωˆ(1) comparable to ω in (25)-(26). The reason that ωˆ(1) can be solved without referring
to the function ωˆ(.) is the same as that ω = βv0(1) in the Proposition-4 equilibrium can
be solved without referring to any other evaluations of functions v(.) or v0(.).
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Appendix I: Proofs
The proof of Proposition 2
LetΠ be the set of all π = (πb, π∗b , π
0
b , πs, π
∗
s, π0s) ∈ R6+ with πb+π∗b+π0b = 1
and πs + π∗s + π0s = 1. Fix m, and by concavity of u and v and Jensen’s
inequality, for any γ(m) in (16), there exist some π ∈ Π and (qb, lb, qs, ls) ∈
[Γb(m)\Γb(m)]× [Γs(m)\Γs(m)] ≡ Γ such that
πbu(qb) + π∗bu(q
∗
b )− πsqs − π∗sq∗s + βv(m− πblb − π∗b l∗b + πsls + π∗sl∗s)
≡ w(π, qb, lb, qs, ls) ≥W (γ(m)),
where (q∗b , l
∗
b) = (q(m, 1), l(m, 1)) and (q
∗
s , l∗s) = (q(1,m), l(1,m)). So if v(m)
is the maximum of w(π, qb, lb, qs, ls) over Π× Γ, then (16) holds. Denote by
(π¯, qb, lb, qs, ls) a maximizer of w(.) with π¯ = (π¯b, π¯∗b , π¯
0
b , π¯s, π¯
∗
s, π¯0s). Now it
suﬃces to show π¯∗b = π¯
∗
s = 1, which clearly implies w(π¯, qb, lb, qs, ls) = v(m).
I first establish some intermediate results, mainly properties of π¯. In what
follows, let wˆ(π) ≡ w(π, qb, lb, qs, ls) and h(π) ≡ m−πblb−π∗b l∗b +πsls+π∗sl∗s .
Claim 1: (i) B(qb, lb,m) < B(q∗b , l
∗
b ,m); (ii) If π¯b > 0 then lb 6= l∗b ; (iii)
S(qs, ls,m) < S(q∗s , l∗s ,m); and (iv) If π¯s > 0 then ls 6= l∗s .
For part (i) of claim 1, first note by (12), B(qb, lb,m) ≤ B(q∗b , l∗b ,m). By
strict monotonicity of v and g(m) < M , v0(g(m)) > 0. So if B(qb, lb,m) =
B(q∗b , l
∗
b ,m) then qb 6= q∗b and lb 6= l∗b , but then any interior linear combination
of (qb, lb) and (q∗b , l
∗
b ), denoted (q, l), satisfies B(q, l,m) > B(q
∗
b , l
∗
b ,m) and
S(q, l, 1) ≥ S(q∗b , l∗b , 1) (recall u is strictly concave), contradicting (12). For
part (ii), if lb = l∗b then part (i) implies u(qb) < u(q
∗
b ), but then (π¯, qb, lb, qs, ls)
cannot be a maximizer of w(.). Analogously, we can establish parts (iii)-(iv).
Next, without loss of generality, we can assume (A1) If l∗b = 0 then
π¯0b = 0; (A2) If l
∗
s = 0 then π¯0s = 0; (A3) If π¯0b > 0 then h(π¯) ≤ g(m); and
(A4) If π¯0s > 0 then h(π¯) ≥ g(m).
For (A1), if π¯0b > 0 then wˆ(π¯) = wˆ(π), where π = (π¯b, π¯
∗
b+π¯
0
b , 0, π¯s, π¯
∗
s, π¯0s),
so we can replace π¯ by this π. Analogously, we can justify (A2); now use
π = (π¯b, π¯∗b , π¯
0
b , π¯s, π¯
∗
s + π¯0s, 0). For (A3), if h(π¯) > g(m) then by (10) and
concavity of v, dwˆ(π(x))/dx ≥ 0 if h(π(x)) ≥ g(m), where π(x) = (π¯b, π¯∗b +
x, π¯0b − x, π¯s, π¯∗s, π¯0s), so we can replace π¯ by the π(x) with h(π(x)) = g(m).
Analogously, we can justify (A4); now use (11) and π(x) = (π¯b, π¯∗b , π¯
0
b , π¯s, π¯
∗
s+
x, π¯0s − x).
Claim 2: (i) If lb < l∗b and π¯b > 0 then h(π¯) ≤ g(m); (ii) If lb > l∗b and
π¯b > 0 then h(π¯) ≥ g(m); (iii) If ls > l∗s and π¯s > 0 then h(π¯) ≤ g(m); and
(iv) If ls < l∗s and π¯s > 0 then h(π¯) ≥ g(m).
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For part (i) of claim 2, suppose h(π¯) > g(m), but then by claim 1 (i)
and concavity of v, dwˆ(π(x))/dx > 0 if h(π(x)) > g(m), where π(x) =
(π¯b − x, π¯∗b + x, π¯0b , π¯s, π¯∗s, π¯0s). The exact argument rules out h(π) < g(m) in
part (ii). Analogously, we can establish parts (iii) and (iv); now use claim 1
(iii) and π(x) = (π¯b, π¯∗b , π¯
0
b , π¯s − x, π¯∗s + x, π¯0s).
Claim 3: h(π¯) = g(m).
For claim 3, first suppose h(π¯) < g(m). Then by (A4), π¯0s = 0; by claim
1 (ii) and claim 2 (ii), if π¯b > 0 then lb < l∗b ; by claim 1 (iv) and claim 2 (iv),
if π¯s > 0 then ls > l∗s . But then it must be h(π¯) ≥ g(m), a contradiction.
Analogously, we can rule out h(π¯) > g(m); now use (A3), claim 1 (ii), claim
2 (i), claim 1 (iv), and claim 2 (iii).
Next, without loss of generality, we can assume (A5) π¯0b π¯
0
s = 0.
For (A5), if π¯0b π¯
0
s > 0 then first by (A1)-(A2), l∗b l
∗
s > 0; then by claim 3
and (10)-(11), dwˆ(π(x))/dx ≥ 0, where π(x) = (π¯b, π¯∗b+xl∗s , π¯0b−xl∗s , π¯s, π¯∗s+
xl∗b , π¯
0
s − xl∗b) (note h(π(x)) = g(m)), so we can replace π¯ by the π(x) with
x = min{π¯0b/l∗s , π¯0s/l∗b}.
Claim 4: (i) If π¯bπ¯s > 0 then (lb − l∗b)(ls − l∗s) < 0; (ii) If π¯0b π¯b > 0 then
lb < l∗b ; and (iii) If π¯
0
sπ¯s > 0 then ls < l∗s .
For part (i) of claim 4, suppose (lb − l∗b)(ls − l∗s) > 0, but then by claim
3 and claim 1 (i) and (iii), dwˆ(π(x))/dx > 0, where π(x) = (π¯b − x, π¯∗b +
x, π¯0b , π¯s− xδ, π¯∗s + xδ, π¯0s) with δ = (lb− l∗b )/(ls− l∗s) (note h(π(x)) = g(m)).
For part (ii), by claim 1 (ii), lb 6= l∗b . Suppose lb > l∗b , but then by claim 3
and (10) and claim 1 (i), dwˆ(π(x))/dx > 0, where π(x) = (π¯b − xl∗b/lb, π¯∗b +
x, π¯0b + xl
∗
b/lb − x, π¯s, π¯∗s, π¯0s) (note h(π(x)) = g(m)). Analogously, we can
establish part (iii); now use claim 1 (iv), claim 3, (11), claim 1 (iii), and
π(x) = (π¯b, π¯∗b , π¯
0
b , π¯s − xl∗s/ls, π¯∗s + x, π¯0s + xl∗s/ls − x).
Finally, I show π¯∗b = π¯
∗
s = 1 by ruling out the following three cases.
(a) π¯0b = π¯
0
s = 0 and π¯b + π¯s > 0. If π¯bπ¯s = 0 then h(π¯) = g(m) cannot
hold. If π¯bπ¯s > 0, then by claim 4 (i), h(π¯) = g(m) cannot hold either.
(b) π¯0b > 0. By (A5), π¯
0
s = 0. If π¯b + π¯s = 0, then h(π¯) = g(m)
cannot hold. If π¯b > 0, then by claim 4 (ii), lb < l∗b so h(π¯) = g(m) can
hold only if π¯s > 0 and ls < l∗s , which contradicts claim 4 (i). So the
remaining possibility is π¯b = 0 and π¯s > 0. Now h(π¯) = g(m) only if
ls < l∗s . But then by (10) and claim 1 (iii), dwˆ(π(x))/dx > 0, where π(x) =
(π¯b, π¯∗b+x(l
∗
s−ls), π¯0b−x(l∗s−ls), π¯s−xl∗b , π¯∗s+xl∗b , π¯0s) (note h(π(x)) = g(m)).
(c) π¯0s > 0. We can rule out case (c) analogously to case (b); here use
(A5), claim 4 (iii) and (i), (11), claim 1 (i), and π(x) = (π¯b − xl∗s , π¯∗b +
xl∗s , π¯0b , π¯s, π¯
∗
s + x(l∗b − lb), π¯0s − x(l∗b − lb)). This completes the proof.
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The proof of Lemma 1
For part (i) of the lemma, let vbn(m) be the supremum of the (expected
lifetime) payoﬀs to the buyer from sequences of his actions starting from a
date when his household holds m, provided that all other agents follow fA.
Note the function vbn : [0,M ] → R is bounded above (recall u is bounded).
Without loss of generality, assume vbn(m) is attained so that
vbn(m)− v(m)
= [Bn(qb, lb,m) + βvbn(m+)− βv(m+)]−Bn(q(m, 1), l(m, 1),m)
< n−1(1− β) + β[vbn(m+)− v(m+)],
where (qb, lb) ∈ Γ
n
b (m) is the buyer’s present-date trade in meeting a regular
seller, m+ is the implied household’s end-of-meeting holding (i.e., m+ =
g(m) + l(m, 1)n−1 − lbn−1), and the inequality follows from the hypothesis.
Iterating this and using boundedness of vbn, we obtain vbn(m)− v(m) < n−1,
as desired. If the agent in concern is a seller, we define vsn analogously and
by the similar argument, we obtain vbn(m)− v(m) < n−1.
For part (ii) of the lemma, let vhn(m) be the (expected lifetime) payoﬀs
to the household from sequences of joint actions of the household members
starting from a date when the household holds m, provided that all agents
outside the household follow fA. Note the function vhn : [0,M ] → R is
bounded above. Without loss of generality, assume vhn(m) is attained so that
vhn(m)− v(m) = [Wn(γ(m)) + βvhn(m+)− βv(m+)]− v(m)
< (1− β) + β[vhn(m+)− v(m+)],
where γ(m) ∈ [Γnb (m) × Γns (m)]I is the household’s present-date trades in
meeting regular agents, m+ is the implied household’s end-of-meeting hold-
ing, and the inequality follows from the hypothesis. Iterating this and using
boundedness of vhn, we obtain vhn(m)− v(m) < , as desired.
The proof of Proposition 3
Let A satisfy (C1)-(C2) and let M be finite. Then we have,
Claim 1: ∀m, (a) Bn(q, l,m) − Bn(q(m, 1), l(m, 1),m) ≤ B(q, l,m) −
B(q(m, 1), l(m, 1),m); (b) Sn(q, l,m) − Sn(q(1,m), l(1,m),m) ≤ S(q, l,m)
−S(q(1,m), l(1,m),m).
Claim 2: ∀ > 0, ∃N s.t. ∀n > N , m ∈ [0,M ], q ≥ 0, and l ∈ [0,m],
Sn(q, l, 1)− Sn(q(m, 1), l(m, 1), 1) < S(q, l, 1)− S(q(m, 1), l(m, 1), 1) + .
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For claim 1, by concavity of v and definitions of v0+ and v0−, ∀z ≥ 0,
if δ > 0 then v0+(z) ≥ [v(z + δ) − v(z)]δ−1; also, ∀z > 0, if δ ∈ (0, z]
then [v(z)− v(z − δ)]δ−1 ≥ v0−(z). Applying these inequalities into (5), (7),
(8), and (9), we obtain claim 1; here let z = g(m) and δ = ln−1 and note
n[v(z + ln−1) − v(z)] = [v(z + δ) − v(z)]δ−1l. For claim 2, by concavity of
v and definitions of v0+ and v0−, ∀ > 0, ∃δ < 1 s.t. ∀δ ∈ (0, δ), v0+(1) <
[v(1 + δ) − v(1)]δ−1 +  and v0−(1) > [v(1) − v(1 − δ)]δ−1 − . Applying
these inequalities into (5), (7), (8), and (9), we obtain claim 2; here let
δ1 = [l − l(1, 1)]n−1, δ2 = [l(1,m) − l(1, 1)]n−1 and ∆i = v(1 + δi) − v(1),
and note v(1 + δ1) − v(1 + δ2) = ∆1 − ∆2, n∆1 = (∆1δ−11 )[l − l(1, 1)] and
n∆2 = (∆2δ−12 )[l(1,m)− l(1, 1)].
Fix  > 0. Let ¯ ≡ (1 − β) and let q and ζ satisfy u(q) = 0.5¯ and
u(q)− u(q − ζ) = 0.25¯.
Now I prove part (i) of the proposition. Fix N such that (N) ∀n > N
claim 2 holds as  is replaced by ζ. Fix n > N , m, (qb, lb) ∈ Γ
n
b (m), and
(qs, ls) ∈ Γns (m). It suﬃces to show (19) and (20) hold. First, by the hypoth-
esis, B(q∗b , l
∗
b ,m) ≥ 0 and S(q∗s , l∗s ,m) ≥ 0, where (q∗b , l∗b ) = (q(m, 1), l(m, 1))
and (q∗s , l∗s) = (q(1,m), l(1,m)), so setting (q, l) = (0, 0) in claim 1 (a) and
(b), we have Bn(q∗b , l
∗
b ,m) ≥ 0 and Sn(q∗s , l∗s ,m) ≥ 0. Next, suppose (20) does
not hold, i.e., Sn(qs, ls,m) − Sn(q∗s , l∗s ,m) ≥ ¯ so (qs, ls) = (0, 0). But then
setting (q, l) = (0, 0) in claim 1 (b), we have S(0, 0,m)− S(q∗s , l∗s ,m) ≥ ¯, a
contradiction to (11) when the household is large. Next, suppose (19) does
not hold, i.e., Bn(qb, lb,m)−Bn(q∗b , l∗b ,m) ≥ ¯. Again (qb, lb) cannot be (0, 0)
so (qb, lb) /∈ Γ
n
b (m)\Γnb (m) and so Sn(qb, lb, 1) − Sn(q∗b , l∗b , 1) ≥ 0, which by
(N) implies S(qb, lb, 1) − S(q∗b , l∗b , 1) > −ζ. Also, by setting (q, l) = (qb, lb)
in claim 1 (a), we have B(qb, lb,m) − B(q∗b , l∗b ,m) ≥ ¯, Bn(qb, lb,m) ≥ ¯ and
B(qb, lb,m) ≥ ¯. By B(qb, lb,m) ≥ ¯, u(qb) > ¯ so qb > q. Setting (q, l) =
(qb − ζ, lb), then S(q, l, 1) − S(q∗b , l∗b , 1) > 0, and B(qb, lb,m) − B(q, l,m) =
u(qb)− u(qb − ζ) < 0.25¯ so B(q, l,m)−B(q∗b , l∗b ,m) > 0, a contradiction to
(12) when the household is large.
Next I prove part (ii) of the proposition. Let z and l satisfy v(z)−v(0) =
0.5¯/β and v(z) − v(z − l) = 0.25¯/β and let η ≡ βv0+(1)l > 0. Fix N
such that (N’) ∀n > N claim 2 holds as  is replaced by min{ζ, η}. Fix
n > N , m and γ(m) ∈ [Γnb (m) × Γns (m)]I . It suﬃces to show (21) holds.
First, by concavity of u and v and Jensen’s inequality, Wn(γ(m)) ≤ w =
πbu(qb) + π∗bu(q
∗
b ) − π∗sq∗s + βv(m+), where (q∗b , l∗b ) and (q∗s , l∗s) are given as
above, (qb, lb) ∈ Γ
n
b (m)\Γnb (m), each π term is non negative, πb+π∗b+π0b = 1,
π∗s + π0s = 1, and m+ = m − πblb − π∗b l∗b + π∗sl∗s . Now suppose (21) does
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not hold so w − v(m) ≥ ¯. Because (16) holds when the household is large,
πb = 0 implies v(m) ≥ w. So πb > 0, and by concavity of u and v and
Jensen’s inequality, we can assume π∗b = 0. By (qb, lb) ∈ Γ
n
b (m)\Γnb (m),
Sn(qb, lb, 1)−Sn(q∗b , l∗b , 1) ≥ 0, which by (N’) implies S(qb, lb, 1)−S(q∗b , l∗b , 1) >
−min{ζ, η}. Let δ1 = πbu(qb)−u(q∗b ), δ2 = (1−π∗s)q∗s+β[v(m0+)−v(g(m))]
and δ3 = β[v(m+)−v(m0+)], where m0+ = m− l∗b +π∗sl∗s , so w−v(m) =
P
i δi.
Note, as in the above, Sn(q∗s , l∗s ,m) ≥ 0; this and concavity of v imply δ2 ≤ 0.
Hence either πbu(qb) − u(q∗b ) ≥ 0.5¯ or v(m+) − v(g(m)) ≥ 0.5¯/β. If the
former then set (q, l) = (qb − ζ, lb); if the latter then set (q, l) = (qb, lb + l).
Either way, S(q, l, 1)− S(q∗b , l∗b , 1) > 0 and πbu(q)− q∗s + βv(m− πbl + l∗s) >
u(q∗b )− q∗s + βv(g(m)), a contradiction to (16) when the household is large.
The proof of Proposition 4
First, I claim that u(y(m,ω, ω)) is strictly increasing, concave and dif-
ferentiable in m, and βv0(1) = ω. To see this, set ωb = ωs = ω in (24). It
is clear that l 7→ y(l, ω, ω) is strictly increasing and so is l 7→ u(y(l, ω, ω)).
By the implicit function theorem, l 7→ y(l, ω, ω) is continuously diﬀerentiable
and so is l 7→ u(y(l, ω, ω)). Diﬀerentiating (24) w.r.t. l at (ωb, ωs) = (ω, ω)
and substituting −y(l, ω, ω)+ωl = (1−λ)[u(y(l, ω, ω))−ωl]/[λu0(y(l, ω, ω))]
(which is from rewriting (24) with (ωb, ωs) = (ω, ω)), we have
y0(l, ω, ω) =
λu0(y)ω + (1− λ)ω
u0(y)− (1− λ)u00(y)[u(y)− ωl]/u0(y) , (35)
where y0(l, ω, ω) denotes the derivative of y(.) w.r.t. its first argument and
y = y(l, ω, ω). By (35) and (U), some algebra confirms u00y0 + u0y00 ≤ 0 so
l 7→ u(y(l, ω, ω)) is concave. By (28), v0(1) = u0(y(1, ω, ω))y0(1, ω, ω). Using
this and (35) with l = 1 and (25), we have βv0(1) = ω (recall yλ = y(1, ω, ω)).
Next, it follows from yλ > 0 and the claim that A in (27) satisfies (C1)-(C2).
Substituting g(mb) = g(ms) = 1 and βv0(1) = ω (all implied by this A) into
(22) and referring to (8)-(9), we see that A satisfies (22) if and only if (i)
λu0(q(mb,ms))[−q(mb,ms) + ωmb] = (1 − λ)[u(q(mb,ms)) − ωmb], and (ii)
u0(q(mb,ms)) ≥ 1. But (i) follows from (24) and (ii) from u0(y(M,ω, ω)) ≥ 1.
Finally, by Propositions 1-2 and the claim, fA is a strong equilibrium.
The proof of Proposition 5
First, I claim that u(y(m, 0, ω˜)) is continuous, concave and strictly in-
creasing in m, βv0−(1) = ω˜ and v0+(1) = 0. Continuity, monotonicity and
v0+(1) = 0 are obvious. Diﬀerentiating (24) w.r.t. l at (ωb, ωs) = (0, ω˜) and
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substituting −y(l, 0, ω˜) + ω˜l = (1 − λ)u(y(l, 0, ω˜))/[λu0(y(l, 0, ω˜))] (which is
from rewriting (24) with (ωb, ωs) = (0, ω˜)), we have
y0(l, 0, ω˜) =
λu0(y)ω˜
u0(y)− (1− λ)u00(y)u(y)/u0(y) , (36)
where y0(l, 0, ω˜) denotes the derivative of y(.) w.r.t. its first argument and
y = y(l, 0, ω˜). By (36) and (U), some algebra confirms u00y0 + u0y00 ≤ 0 so
l 7→ u(y(l, 0, ω˜)) is concave. By (32), v0−(1) = u0(y(1, 0, ω˜))y0(1, 0, ω˜). Using
this, (36) with l = 1 and (29), we have βv0−(1) = ω˜ (recall y˜λ = y(1, 0, ω˜)).
Next, it follows from y˜λ > 0 and the claim that A in (31) satisfies (C1)-(C2).
Substituting g(mb) = g(ms) = 1 and βv0−(1) = ω˜ and βv0+(1) = 0 (all implied
by this A) into (22) and referring to (8)-(9), we see that A satisfies (22) if and
only if λu0(q(mb,ms))[−q(mb,ms) + ω˜mb] = (1 − λ)u(q(mb,ms)). But this
follows from (24). Finally, see the main text for a beneficial joint deviation
in equilibrium fA.
The proof of Proposition 6
When the household is finite, A satisfies (22) with λ = 1 (refer to (5) and
(7)) if and only if
q(mb,ms) = nβ[v(g(ms)−l(1,ms)n−1+l(mb,ms)n−1)−v(g(ms)−l(1,ms)n−1)];
(37)
[l(mb,ms) = mb]⇒ [u0(q(mb,ms))v0−(g(ms)− l(1,ms)n−1 + l(mb,ms)n−1)
≥ v0+(g(mb) + l(mb, 1)n−1 − l(mb,ms)n−1)]; (38)
[l(mb,ms) < mb]⇒ [u0(q(mb,ms))v0+(g(ms)− l(1,ms)n−1 + l(mb,ms)n−1)
≤ v0−(g(mb) + l(mb, 1)n−1 − l(mb,ms)n−1)]. (39)
Also notice that g(1) = 1, which is used frequently below.
Now I prove part (i) of the proposition. Let ∆ satisfy u(β∆) < ∆, and let
V be the set of functions ν : [0,M ]→ R that is continuous, non decreasing,
concave, and with ν(1)− ν(0) ≤ ∆. Let K = [1− n−1, 1] and letW be the
set of functions w : K → R with w = ν on K for some ν ∈ V. For w ∈W
and m ∈ [0, 1], let
y(m,w) = nβ[w(1− n−1 +mn−1)− w(1− n−1)]. (40)
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Then let Gw : K → R be defined by
Gw(m) = u(y(m,w))− y(1, w) + βw(1). (41)
Suppose that w is a fixed point of G with y(1, w) > 0. Let the allocation
A be defined by
q(mb,ms) = y(min{mb, 1}, w), l(mb,ms) = mb. (42)
This A determines the value function
v(m) = u(y(min{m, 1}, w))− y(1, w) + βv(1), (43)
and note by w = Gw, v = w on K. Clearly A satisfies (C1)-(C2). Substitut-
ing g(mb) = g(ms) = 1 and v0+(1) = 0 (all implied by A) into (37)-(39), we
immediately see that A satisfies (37)-(39). It is also easy to verify that fA is
not a Definition-2 strong equilibrium.
It remains to find a fixed point of G with y(1, w) > 0. To this end, letW
be equipped with the sup norm topology, and I claim (i)W is compact and
convex; and (ii)GW ⊂W. For (i), it is obvious thatW is convex and closed.
Fix w and let ν ∈ V satisfy ν = w on K. By ν(1)− ν(0) ≤ ∆, w0+(1− n−1)
must be bounded above by ∆. This and concavity of w imply that W is
equicontinuous and hence compact (Arzelà-Ascoli theorem). For (ii), fix w,
and it is obvious that Gw is non decreasing, continuous and concave. For
this w, let v ∈ V be defined by (43) and it is obvious that v = Gw on K;
then by y(1, w) ≤ nβ[w(1) − w(1 − n−1)] ≤ β∆ and y(0, w) ≥ 0, we have
v(1)− v(0) ≤ u(β∆) < ∆.
BecauseW is compact, y(., .) is uniformly continuous on [0, 1]×W and
so wj → w implies y(., wj) → y(., w) uniformly, that is, G : W→W is
continuous. To rule out the trivial fixed point of G (the zero function), I
introduce a sequence of auxiliary mappings. In specific, choose suﬃciently
large integer i so that ∀w ∈W, wi : K → R with wi(m) = w(m) +m/i is
in W. Then let Giw : K → R be defined by Giw(m) = Gwi(m). Because
the mapping w 7→ wi is continuous, Gi is continuous, and so by Sauder’s
fixed point theorem, Gi has a fixed point wi, that is, wi = Giwi = Gwii.
BecauseW is compact, the sequence {wi} has a convergent subsequence. To
simplify notation, denote this subsequence by {wi} and let w be its limit
point. Because w is also the limit of point of {wii} and G is continuous and
wi = Gwii, it follows that w is a fixed point of G. Because wii is concave and
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strictly increasing, it follows that wi = Gwii is concave and non decreasing,
and hence that w0i−(1) is defined and nonnegative. It follows from Gwii =
wi and (40)-(41) that w0i−(1) = βu0(y(1, wii))[w0i−(1) + 1/i], which implies
y(1, wii) ≥ y1 (y1 is defined by (25) and note βu0(y1) = 1). By continuity of
y(1, .), y(1, w) ≥ y1. (It can actually be shown that y(1, w) = y1.)
Next I prove part (ii) of the proposition. Suppose that A satisfies hy-
potheses but n = 1. Setting (mb,ms) = (1, 1) in (37) and using l(1, 1) = 1
and q(1, 1) > 0, we have v(1) > v(0). So by continuity and concavity of v,
v is strictly increasing in a neighborhood of 0. By continuity, we can find
m¯ ∈ (0, 1) close to 0 so v(m¯) close to v(0) and so ∀m ∈ [0, m¯], q(m, 1) close
to 0 (again use (37) and note l(m, 1) ≤ m) and u0(q(m, 1)) > 1.
Let z ≡ min{m : v(m) = v(1)} = 1. First consider z ≥ 1. I claim that
∀m ∈ [0, m¯],m = l(m, 1) and l(1,m) = 1 so that g(m) = 1. By this claim and
(37) and l(1, 1) = 1, q(m, 1) = βv(m)− βv(0) and q(1,m) = βv(1) − βv(0)
so v(m) = u(q(m, 1)) + βv(0). Then by q(0, 1) = 0 and u(0) = 0, we have
v(0) = 0 so v(m) = u(q(m, 1)) or v(m) = u(βv(m)). But this cannot hold
for all m ∈ [0, m¯], because u is strictly concave and v is concave.
To see the claim, fix m ∈ [0, m¯]. First suppose l(1,m) < 1. Setting
(mb,ms) = (1,m) in (39) and using l(1, 1) = 1, we have
u0(q(1,m))v0+(g(m)) ≤ v0−(2− l(1,m)). (44)
Setting (mb,ms) = (1, 1) in (38) gives u0(q(1, 1))v0−(1) ≥ v0+(1). Comparing
this with (44) and using l(1,m) < 1 and q(1,m) < q(1, 1) (implied by (37)
and l(1,m) < l(1, 1)), we have g(m) ≥ 1 so l(m, 1) < m. Then setting
(mb,ms) = (m, 1) in (39) gives u0(q(m, 1))v0+(l(m, 1)) ≤ v0−(g(m)), which
by u0(q(m, 1)) > 1 implies l(m, 1) ≥ g(m), contradicting g(m) ≥ 1 because
l(m, 1) < m ≤ m¯ < 1. So l(1,m) = 1. Now suppose l(m, 1) < m. Then again
u0(q(m, 1))v0+(l(m, 1)) ≤ v0−(g(m)) so l(m, 1) ≥ g(m). Given l(1,m) = 1,
l(m, 1) < m implies g(m) > 1, contradicting l(m, 1) ≥ g(m) because m < 1.
In case z < 1, v0+(z) = 0. Using this and by the similar argument to
establish the above claim, we can verify that ∀m ∈ [0, m¯], l(m, 1) = m and
l(1,m) ∈ [z, 1], which again imply v(m) = u(βv(m)).
Appendix II: The programmer-automata interpretation
Here I study the same physical environment as in section 2. But now
I assume that there is a unique decision maker in each household, labelled
as the programmer, and that each agent (buyer or seller) is an automaton.
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As indicated above, Shi [16] and most recent literature seemingly adopt this
interpretation of the household construct. Following this literature, I restrict
attention to the ultimatum game (buyers make oﬀers) in pairwise meetings.
First, I provide a formal definition of equilibrium. For a generic house-
hold, the programmer’s set of actions in a date is K =
Q
i∈I K
i
b ×
Q
i∈I K
i
s,
where Kib = Kb is the set of oﬀering programs, and K
i
s = Ks is the set of
responding programs; that is, the programmer chooses for each of its buyers
an oﬀering program from Kb, and for each of its sellers a responding program
from Ks. An oﬀering program is a pair of real-valued functions (q(.), l(.)) on
[0,M ]2; a responding program is a function σ(.) from [0,M ]2×R2+ to {0, 1}.
To be specific, consider a meeting between a buyer from a household
whose start-of-date money holding ismb, and a seller from a household whose
start-of-date money holding is ms. Let (q(.), l(.)) be the oﬀering program
carried by the buyer and let σ(.) be the responding program carried by the
seller. Then the buyer’s oﬀer is (q(mb,ms), l(mb,ms)). If the 0 ≤ l(mb,ms) ≤
mb and σ(mb,ms, (q(mb,ms), l(mb,ms)) = 1, then this oﬀer is carried out;
otherwise, there is no trade.
Let F denote a generic strategy of a generic programmer. I restrict at-
tention to F that does not depend on the programmer’s private information
and the calendar time, so I can express F as a mapping from [0,M ] to K.
I restrict attention to symmetric equilibrium. Formally, an equilibrium is a
strategy profile represented by F so that it is optimal for a programmer to
choose programmes indicated by F provided that all other programmers to
choose programmes indicated by F currently and in the future. Note any
equilibrium is degenerate (in the same sense as in the main text).
Next, I show that there exists a continuum of equilibria when the house-
hold is large. To this end, let y1 be the one given by (25)-(26) and letM > 1
satisfy u0(My1) ≥ 1. Fix y ∈ (0, y1] and let F (m) = {(qim(.), lim(.)), σim(.)}i∈I
be such that (qim(.), lim(.)) = (qm(.), lm(.)) and σim(.) = σm(.) ∀i, where
∀(mb,ms), (qm(mb,ms), lm(mb,ms)) = (mby,mb) ,
σm(q, l,mb,ms) = 1 if q ≤ ly, and σm(q, l,mb,ms) = 0 otherwise.
If all programmers follow F , then the value function defined on the house-
hold’s money holdings is the unique continuous, strictly increasing, and con-
cave function satisfying v(m) = u(my)− y + βv(1). Using u0(My) ≥ 1, one
can verify that this v also satisfies
v(m) = max
0≤l≤m,0≤ρ≤1
u(ly)− ρy + βv(m+ ρ− l). (45)
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Then by (45) and concavity of u and v and Jensen’s inequality, one pro-
grammer does not gain from deviations provided that all other programmers
follow F .
Therefore, for each y ∈ (0, y1], there exists an equilibrium when the house-
hold is large. In the equilibrium, (y, 1) is the regular-meeting trade (in the
same sense as in the main text), and the value function v on the household’s
money holdings is concave. In contrast, under the team interpretation, if A
with l(1, 1) = 1 and with a concave v is an equilibrium allocation generated
by the ultimatum game when the household is large, then it can be shown
that the regular-meeting output equals y1.
Finally, I provide a brief comparison with Shi [16]. Shi does not give
explicit description about the household’s set of actions and strategies. He
formulates a value function v comparable to the one in (45). He argues
that the regular-meeting output y must equal βv0(1), which implies y = y1.
Shi’s argument for y = βv0(1) is based on a reasoning applied to perfect
equilibrium in a sequential-move game, i.e., a regular seller accepts any oﬀer
(q, l) no worse than no trade. But this reasoning has no bite in the automata
game (which is a simultaneous-move game).
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